A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1727722
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2018.07.032zbMath1419.91038OpenAlexW2897672016WikidataQ129114957 ScholiaQ129114957MaRDI QIDQ1727722
Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 20 February 2019
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/124189
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- On \(\alpha\)-roughly weighted games
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Complete simple games
- Ternary voting games
- On the characterization of weighted simple games
- A power analysis of linear games with consensus
- Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting
- The golden number and Fibonacci sequences in the design of voting structures
- The inverse Banzhaf problem
- On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- On the inverse power index problem
- A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- Algebraic Techniques for Constructing Minimal Weight Threshold Functions
- Finding Optimal Solutions for Voting Game Design Problems
