Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories

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Publication:952784

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.014zbMath1153.91393OpenAlexW2019346520MaRDI QIDQ952784

Roland Pongou, Bertrand Mbama Engoulou, Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.014



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