A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game

DOI10.2140/pjm.1966.18.289zbMath0144.43403OpenAlexW2005945718MaRDI QIDQ2523685

Publication date: 1966

Published in: Pacific Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1966.18.289

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

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