Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
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Cites work
- A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
- A class of simple games
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- Economic power and values of games
- Hierarchies achievable in simple games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 750169 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- On power distribution in weighted voting
- On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
- Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
- Simple majority achievable hierarchies
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Ternary voting games
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(18)- Properties of ladder tournaments
- A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
- A critical analysis on the notion of power
- Public good indices for games with several levels of approval
- A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games
- Rationing to avoid conflict: a centralized assignment problem
- Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
- On anonymous and weighted voting systems
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
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