Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.007zbMath1368.91073MaRDI QIDQ898674

Josep Freixas, Cameron C. Parker

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/80825

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative games; Nash equilibrium; single-peaked preferences; \((j,k)\)-games; insincere voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games, Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index, Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure, On anonymous and weighted voting systems, The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games, Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power

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