Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.08.007zbMATH Open1368.91073OpenAlexW1655117327MaRDI QIDQ898674FDOQ898674

Authors: Josep Freixas, Cameron Parker 

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/80825

Recommendations

• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
• Manipulation in Games
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• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesNash equilibriumsingle-peaked preferences\((j,k)\)-gamesinsincere voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Ternary voting games
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Mathematics and Politics
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

Cited In (8)

• On anonymous and weighted voting systems
• A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
• The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
• Manipulation in Games
• The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
• Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure

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