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- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- Algebraic aggregation theory
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Distance-based and ad hoc consensus models in ordinal preference ranking
- From Linear Separability to Unimodality: A Hierarchy of Pseudo-Boolean Functions
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematics and Politics
- On the characterization of weighted simple games
- On the theory of aggregation
- Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Social choice and individual values
- Stochastic Models in Reliability
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Ternary voting games
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- Weighted committee games
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(5)- On the construction of high-dimensional simple games
- Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting
- Anonymous voting rules with abstention: weighted voting
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