On anonymous and weighted voting systems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:825071
DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09814-3zbMATH Open1479.91107OpenAlexW3158816651MaRDI QIDQ825071FDOQ825071
Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons
Publication date: 17 December 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09814-3
Recommendations
decision-makingpseudo-Boolean functionsenumerationsanonymous decision systemsmultichoice gamesweighted decision systems
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Distance-based and ad hoc consensus models in ordinal preference ranking
- Social choice and individual values
- Algebraic aggregation theory
- On the theory of aggregation
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Ternary voting games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stochastic Models in Reliability
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- Mathematics and Politics
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- On the characterization of weighted simple games
- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- From Linear Separability to Unimodality: A Hierarchy of Pseudo-Boolean Functions
- Weighted committee games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (3)
This page was built for publication: On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q825071)