A Characterization of Weighted Voting
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Publication:4018821
DOI10.2307/2159360zbMath0764.90018OpenAlexW4233424116MaRDI QIDQ4018821
Alan D. Taylor, William S. Zwicker
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2159360
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