Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035zbMath1188.91060MaRDI QIDQ1036572

William S. Zwicker, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035

zbMATH Keywords

abstention; anonymity; (\(j,k)\) games; absolute and simple strict majority rule; games with several levels of approval; grading systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

The influence relation for ternary voting games, Quaternary dichotomous voting rules, Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention, Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity, Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems, Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting, On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games, Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?

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