The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0219-9zbMATH Open1090.91018OpenAlexW2063171637MaRDI QIDQ1762848FDOQ1762848

Authors: Paulo P. Côrte-Real, Paulo T. Pereira 

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22903

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (13)

• Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
• Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
• To vote or not to vote: What is the quota?
• Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
• Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums
• Referenda as a catch-22
• A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed
• Quota rules for incomplete judgments
• The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?

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