Referenda as a catch-22

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0483-4zbMATH Open1235.91156OpenAlexW2111632081MaRDI QIDQ647545FDOQ647545

Authors: Dimitrios Xefteris 

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0483-4

Recommendations

• Voting paradoxes and referenda
• Majority rip-off in referendum voting
• A model of referendum
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
• Optimal majority rule in referenda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
• The welfare effects of public opinion polls

Cited In (1)

• Voting paradoxes and referenda

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