Quota rules for incomplete judgments
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Publication:2203496
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.005zbMath1448.91084OpenAlexW3044251023MaRDI QIDQ2203496
Publication date: 7 October 2020
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.005
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