Quota rules for incomplete judgments

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.005zbMath1448.91084OpenAlexW3044251023MaRDI QIDQ2203496

Zoi Terzopoulou

Publication date: 7 October 2020

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

judgment aggregationquota rulesaxiomatic methodologyincomplete inputs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

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