Quota rules for incomplete judgments
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Publication:2203496
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Cites work
- A hierarchical approach to judgment aggregation with abstentions
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Complexity of judgment aggregation
- Computational aspects of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation without full rationality
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- The handbook of rational and social choice. An overview of new foundations and applications.
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
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