Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
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Publication:2015028
Recommendations
- Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
- The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- Voting paradoxes and referenda
Cited in
(6)- The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- Resolute majority rules
- Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
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