Influence decision models: from cooperative game theory to social network analysis
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Cited in
(8)- On influence, stable behavior, and the most influential individuals in networks: a game-theoretic approach
- Computing an effective decision making group of a society using social network analysis
- Cooperation through social influence
- Different approaches to influence based on social networks and simple games
- Satisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models
- LSTEG: an evolutionary game model leveraging deep reinforcement learning for privacy behavior analysis on social networks
- A model of influence based on aggregation functions
- A graph-theoretical basis of stochastic-cascading network influence: characterizations of influence-based centrality
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