Influence decision models: from cooperative game theory to social network analysis

DOI10.1016/J.COSREV.2020.100343zbMATH Open1486.91005OpenAlexW3115990450MaRDI QIDQ826316FDOQ826316

Authors: Xavier Molinero, Fabián Riquelme 

Publication date: 20 December 2021

Published in: Computer Science Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2020.100343

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zbMATH Keywords

simple gamedecision-makingcentrality measurespread of influencepower indexinfluence game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

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Cited In (3)

• On influence, stable behavior, and the most influential individuals in networks: a game-theoretic approach
• LSTEG: an evolutionary game model leveraging deep reinforcement learning for privacy behavior analysis on social networks
• A model of influence based on aggregation functions

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