Recommendations
- Evaluation of decision power in multi-dimensional rules
- Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
- A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
Cites work
- A Characterization of Weighted Voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Ternary voting games
- The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
Cited in
(7)- Evaluation of decision power in multi-dimensional rules
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators
- The problem of no hands: responsibility voids in collective decisions
- Rules and Derived Rules
- The stability of multi-dimensional rules
- Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
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