A Characterization of Weighted Voting
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(62)- On anonymous and weighted voting systems
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6099704 (Why is no real title available?)
- Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value
- A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
- On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables
- The fundamental theorem of voting schemes
- Information design for weighted voting
- Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
- The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
- Biased halfspaces, noise sensitivity, and local Chernoff inequalities
- A note on hierarchies in weighted voting games and partitions
- Simple games and weighted games: A theoretical and computational viewpoint
- Threshold complexes and connections to number theory
- Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
- Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction
- Effectivity functions and simple games
- Complete simple games
- The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
- On the characterization of weighted simple games
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
- Simple games versus weighted voting games
- Three hierarchies of simple games parameterized by ``resource parameters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6389705 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interval measures of power
- Weightedness for simple games with less than 9 voters
- Mathematical structures of simple voting games
- On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
- Simple majority achievable hierarchies
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Weighted and roughly weighted simple games
- Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
- Weighted voting games
- The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids
- Enumerating and categorizing positive Boolean functions separable by a \(k\)-additive capacity
- Trading transforms of non-weighted simple games and integer weights of weighted simple games
- Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting
- Influence decision models: from cooperative game theory to social network analysis
- Robust multivalued solutions for assignment problems: A note
- Dimension of complete simple games with minimum
- Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
- Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules
- Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications
- On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games
- Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem
- Weighted approval voting
- Multi-dimensional rules
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
- Some Advances in the Theory of Voting Systems Based on Experimental Algorithms
- On the Coleman indices of voting power
- The stability of multi-dimensional rules
- Multidimension: a dimensionality extension of simple games
- Simple games and magic squares
- Trading properties and Alexandrov kernels for Boolean functions
- Different ways to represent weighted majority games
- Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences
- Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language
This page was built for publication: A Characterization of Weighted Voting
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4018821)
