Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00752-7MaRDI QIDQ1366888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sven Berg

Publication date 17 September 1997

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00752-7

zbMATH Keywords

correlated votesdichotomous votingexpert rulesweighted majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
• Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules
• On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
• Probabilistic comparison of weighted majority rules
• Weighted partial order oriented three-way decisions under score-based common voting rules
• On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games
• A characterization for qualified majority voting rules

Cites work

• Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
• Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
• Power Structure in Dichotomous Voting
• The significance of independent decisions in uncertain dichotomous choice situations

Cited in

(17)

• Collective decision making in hierarchies
• The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations
• On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting
• An analysis of majority systems with dependent agents in a simple subtraction game
• One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
• Probabilistic comparison of weighted majority rules
• Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
• К оценке эффективности голосующих процедур
• The voting as a way to increase the decision reliability.
• The price of independence in a model with unknown dependence
• Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation
• Effectiveness, decisiveness, and success in weighted voting systems: collective behavior and voting measures
• The significance of independent decisions in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
• The importance of expertise in group decisions
• Effective group size of majority vote accuracy in sequential decision-making

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