Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems

DOI10.2307/3214318MaRDI QIDQ3823543zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philip J. Boland, Frank Proschan, Y. L. Tong

Publication date 1989

Published in Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3214318

zbMATH Keywords

reliability theoryvoting systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Applications of renewal theory (reliability, demand theory, etc.) (60K10) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(22)

• An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
• Correlated majority model
• Collective decision making in hierarchies
• Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
• A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
• Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions
• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
• An analysis of majority systems with dependent agents in a simple subtraction game
• A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor
• General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
• Majority vote of even and odd experts in a polychotomous choice situation
• A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
• Signatures of indirect majority systems
• К оценке эффективности голосующих процедур
• Range of Asymptotic Behaviour of the Optimality Probability of the Expert and Majority Rules
• Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
• Optimizing political influence: a jury theorem with dynamic competence and dependence
• Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
• Aggregation of antagonistic contingent preferences: when is it possible?
• Effective group size of majority vote accuracy in sequential decision-making

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