Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem

DOI10.1007/S11238-008-9120-4zbMATH Open1232.91177OpenAlexW2076091454MaRDI QIDQ708796FDOQ708796

Authors: Serguei Kaniovski 

Publication date: 14 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9120-4

Recommendations

• Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
• A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
• Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
• Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters

zbMATH Keywords

dichotomous choiceCondorcet's jury theoremcorrelated votes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
• The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
• A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
• Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
• Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
• The binomial distribution with dependent Bernoulli trials

Cited In (14)

• The importance of expertise in group decisions
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Why are experts correlated? Decomposing correlations between judges
• Voting rules as statistical estimators
• Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
• A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
• Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
• An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
• Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
• Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
• A note on the Condorcet jury theorem for couples
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes

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