Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
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Publication:708796
Recommendations
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Cites Work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3733803 (Why is no real title available?)
- A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
- Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
- Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
- Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
- The binomial distribution with dependent Bernoulli trials
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
Cited In (16)
- The importance of expertise in group decisions
- Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
- Why are experts correlated? Decomposing correlations between judges
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- The Condorcet jur(ies) theorem
- Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
- A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
- Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
- Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
- On the probability of the Condorcet jury theorem or the miracle of aggregation
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- A note on the Condorcet jury theorem for couples
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
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