Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
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Publication:3823543
DOI10.2307/3214318zbMath0671.60010OpenAlexW2320917242MaRDI QIDQ3823543
Frank Proschan, Philip J. Boland, Y. L. Tong
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3214318
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Applications of renewal theory (reliability, demand theory, etc.) (60K10) Social choice (91B14)
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