General representation of epistemically optimal procedures

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2zbMath1158.91346OpenAlexW2170935332MaRDI QIDQ2432493

Franz Dietrich

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

First and second best voting rules in committees ⋮ One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? ⋮ Scoring rules for judgment aggregation ⋮ Voting rules as statistical estimators

Cites Work

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• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• The optimality of the expert and majority rules under exponentially distributed competence
• Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
• Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence
• Modelling dependence in simple and indirect majority systems
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result

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