General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
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Publication:2432493
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2zbMath1158.91346OpenAlexW2170935332MaRDI QIDQ2432493
Publication date: 25 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2
Related Items (4)
First and second best voting rules in committees ⋮ One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? ⋮ Scoring rules for judgment aggregation ⋮ Voting rules as statistical estimators
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