Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
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Publication:2343313
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011zbMath1310.91059OpenAlexW2033197308MaRDI QIDQ2343313
Johanna M. M. Goertz, François Maniquet
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011
Related Items (3)
(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
Cites Work
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Large Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
- One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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