Large Poisson games
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Publication:1590050
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2453zbMath1044.91004OpenAlexW2089219222MaRDI QIDQ1590050
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/80f627bafb68a89fd4f6bb75e61147ffa0a01566
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