Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2830zbMath1021.91011OpenAlexW2054135491MaRDI QIDQ1599834

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 9 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2830

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulepluralityPoisson gamecandidatenumber approval votingserious race

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (46)

Poisson voting games under proportional rule ⋮ Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections ⋮ Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule ⋮ Approval voting and scoring rules with common values ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Qualified voting systems ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Poisson-Cournot games ⋮ On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules ⋮ Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences ⋮ When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? ⋮ Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment ⋮ The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population ⋮ A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections ⋮ Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Weak undominance in scoring rule elections ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Approval quorums dominate participation quorums ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ The Basic Approval Voting Game ⋮ Approval Voting in Large Electorates ⋮ In Silico Voting Experiments ⋮ Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting ⋮ Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting ⋮ Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections ⋮ Piercing numbers in approval voting ⋮ Electoral institutions with impressionable voters ⋮ Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation ⋮ Introduction to political science ⋮ On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Cites Work

• Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games

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