Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.003zbMATH Open1393.91045DBLPjournals/geb/BoutonCL17OpenAlexW1750045767WikidataQ42038855 ScholiaQ42038855MaRDI QIDQ523012FDOQ523012

Authors Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira, Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5348044

zbMATH Keywords

experimentspluralityaggregate uncertaintymulticandidate electionsrational voter model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• The calculus of ethical voting
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Voting as Communicating

Cited in

(9)

• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
• Coordinated democracy
• Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
• Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
• A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• Electoral turnout with divided opposition
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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