Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
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Publication:554490
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.03.003zbMATH Open1229.91111OpenAlexW2064826385MaRDI QIDQ554490FDOQ554490
Authors: Patrick Hummel 
Publication date: 4 August 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003
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Cites Work
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
- A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups
- A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules
Cited In (11)
- Information aggregation with runoff voting
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting with limited information and many alternatives
- Pre-election polling and third party candidates
- Information aggregation in Poisson elections
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
- Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Instance-optimal information-based voting
- Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
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