Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.03.003MaRDI QIDQ554490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Hummel

Publication date 4 August 2011

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups
• A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Convergence results for unanimous voting
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?

Cited in

(11)

• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
• Pre-election polling and third party candidates
• Voting with limited information and many alternatives
• Information aggregation in Poisson elections
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
• Instance-optimal information-based voting
• Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

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