Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.10.003MaRDI QIDQ2634478zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shin Sato

Publication date 9 February 2016

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Informational requirements of social choice rules

Cited in

(5)

• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Corrigendum to ``Informational requirements of social choice rules
• Informational requirements of social choice rules
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Combinatorics of Election Scores

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