Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2634478
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.10.003zbMATH Open1347.91135OpenAlexW2173815453MaRDI QIDQ2634478FDOQ2634478
Authors: Shin Sato 
Publication date: 9 February 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003
Recommendations
- Informational requirements of social choice rules
- Information aggregation with runoff voting
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
Cites Work
- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Informational requirements of social choice rules
Cited In (5)
This page was built for publication: Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2634478)
