Characterizations of the plurality function
The plurality function assigns to a profile of individual voter preferences over a set \(A\) of alternatives, the alternative or set of alternatives having the most first place votes. The author gives various sets of axioms on general ``consensus functions that characterize the plurality function. Results are obtained in cases where individual preferences are given by rankings (the rank-set setting) and where they are given by first choices (the choices-set setting). The work in the latter setting builds upon and improves characterization obtained by Richelson. The paper closes with a number of interesting open questions.
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4204191 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the possible merging functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The median procedure for n-trees
- Informational requirements of social choice rules
- Size approval voting
- A characterization of the prudent order preference function
- On the indicator function of the plurality function
- Consensus sequences based on plurality rule
- Interpreting consensus sequences based on plurality rule
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
- Description of the solutions of a system of functional equations related to plurality functions: The low-dimensional cases
- Remarks on the plurality function
- The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
- A system of functional equations related to plurality functions. A method for the construction of the solutions
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Computer science and decision theory
- Axiomatic characterization of the median and antimedian function on a complete graph minus a matching
- Finding socially best spanning treesî
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- An ABC-problem for location and consensus functions on graphs
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- On the Indicator Plurality Function
- Five axioms for location functions on median graphs
- Popular spanning trees
- Adopting a Plurality Vote Perspective
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
- The median function of a block graph: axiomatic characterizations
- Construction of systems of sets related to the plurality functions
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
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