Consensus rules for committee elections
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Publication:1296465
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00033-4zbMath0936.91015OpenAlexW2095257534MaRDI QIDQ1296465
William H. E. Day, Hans-Hermann Bock, Fred R. McMorris
Publication date: 25 May 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00033-4
Related Items (6)
Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ Attainable results in committee elections.
Cites Work
- Consistency of decision processes
- Pattern recognition in several sequences: Consensus and alignment
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Geometry of voting
- On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
- The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
- Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
- Stability in Voting
- Voting by Committees
- A Formal Theory of Consensus
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
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