Recommendations
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- Fair voting rules in committees
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- Voting by Committees
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- On stable rules for selecting committees
Cites work
- A Formal Theory of Consensus
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
- Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
- Consistency of decision processes
- Geometry of voting
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
- Pattern recognition in several sequences: Consensus and alignment
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Stability in Voting
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(20)- On the existence of majority committee
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- Consensus reaching in committees
- Method of generating functions for procedure of committee electing
- Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Attainable results in committee elections.
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Representative committees of peers
- Committee selection under weight constraints
- Committee Selection with a Weight Constraint Based on Lexicographic Rankings of Individuals
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