Consensus rules for committee elections
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Publication:1296465
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00033-4zbMATH Open0936.91015OpenAlexW2095257534MaRDI QIDQ1296465FDOQ1296465
W. H. E. Day, H.-H. Bock, F. R. McMorris
Publication date: 25 May 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00033-4
Cites Work
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Geometry of voting
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- A Formal Theory of Consensus
- Voting by Committees
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Consistency of decision processes
- Stability in Voting
- Pattern recognition in several sequences: Consensus and alignment
- Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
- Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
- On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
- The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
Cited In (12)
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Attainable results in committee elections.
- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorateβs Will?
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
- On the existence of majority committee
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
Recommendations
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections π π
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. π π
- Fair Voting Rules in Committees π π
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints π π
- Voting by committees under constraints π π
- Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules π π
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies π π
- Voting by Committees π π
- First and second best voting rules in committees π π
- On stable rules for selecting committees π π
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