Formation of committees through random voting rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13MaRDI QIDQ5111109zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13

zbMATH Keywords

random social choice functionsclassical committee formation modelrandom voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Dictatorial domains
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Random dictatorship domains
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints

Cited in

(7)

• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898602 (Why is no real title available?)
• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
• Decomposing random mechanisms

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