Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13zbMATH Open1443.91129OpenAlexW2947770114MaRDI QIDQ5111109FDOQ5111109

Arunava Sen, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13

zbMATH Keywords

random social choice functionsclassical committee formation modelrandom voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Voting by Committees
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Dictatorial domains
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• Random dictatorship domains
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property

Cited In (6)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees

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