Formation of committees through random voting rules
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Publication:5111109
Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Dictatorial domains
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Random dictatorship domains
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
Cited in
(7)- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
- Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898602 (Why is no real title available?)
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
- Decomposing random mechanisms
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