Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0718-7MaRDI QIDQ2247939zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joaquín Pérez, Omar De La Cruz

Publication date 30 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7

zbMATH Keywords

committeesd'Hondt ruleJefferson ruleNash equilibriumparliament formationpolitical decisionvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) History, political science (91F10)

Review text

The paper under review considers a parliament consisting of, say \(k\), groups, where one may think of political parties. For a specific task they have to jointly form a committee of size \(q\). This committee is formed via the following voting procedure: Every member of the parliament votes for one out of a set of candidates. The committee then is assembled by the \(q\) candidates who received the most votes. Under certain conditions the outcome of this game can be described by a well-known allocation rule, i.e., the Jefferson-d'Hondt rule. The authors assume that the \(k\) groups act strategically, i.e., the members of the parliament are acting with respect to the global strategy of their group and do not have own preferences. The preferences of the groups are getting as much as possible own committee members in the first and as many as possible votes in the second run. In order to guarantee a deterministic decision a certain tie-breaking rule is assumed. If fractional votes are allowed, then the set of allocations included in the Jefferson-d'Hondt set coincide with the set of Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. If the parliament members are not allowed to split their vote, then Nash equilibria have to be near to the elements of the Jefferson-d'Hondt set in technically precise way.

Recommendations

• Formation of committees through random voting rules
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• On the existence of majority committee
• Strict proportional power and fair voting rules in committees
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index
• Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules
• On Forming Committees
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection

Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(4)

• Alliance incentives under the D'Hondt method
• A disproportionality bias in the bureau of the regional assembly of Madrid
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
• Nomination equilibria and d`Hondt like allocation rules

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