Decomposing random mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:898659
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.002zbMath1368.91110MaRDI QIDQ898659
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.002
individual rationality; strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; total unimodularity; random mechanisms; universal truthfulness
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