An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.11.008MaRDI QIDQ433712zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jérémy Picot, Arunava Sen

Publication date 6 July 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessextreme point characterizationrandom social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(13)

• A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Random dictatorship domains
• Formation of committees through random voting rules
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• Decomposing random mechanisms

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