An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
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Publication:433712
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008zbMath1242.91061MaRDI QIDQ433712
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions, Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules, On the manipulability of equitable voting rules, An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains, Decomposing random mechanisms, The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains, On random social choice functions with the tops-only property, Random dictatorship domains, Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
Cites Work
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
