An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
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Publication:433712
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.11.008zbMATH Open1242.91061OpenAlexW2055903327MaRDI QIDQ433712FDOQ433712
Authors: Jérémy Picot, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008
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Cites Work
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
Cited In (11)
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Random dictatorship domains
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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