The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.004zbMath1415.91123OpenAlexW2605813789MaRDI QIDQ1680094

Jérémy Picot, Abhishek Gaurav, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 22 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functionsdichotomous domainsdomains deterministic extreme point

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

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Cites Work

• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Random dictatorship domains
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences

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