Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
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Publication:5022149
DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_4zbMATH Open1481.91075OpenAlexW4205626467MaRDI QIDQ5022149FDOQ5022149
Authors: Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_4
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Cited In (2)
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