A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions
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Publication:6105153
DOI10.3390/g13060078zbMath1519.91103OpenAlexW4309459564MaRDI QIDQ6105153
Achille Basile, Ciro Tarantino, Anna De Simone
Publication date: 26 June 2023
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060078
Cites Work
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