Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2673213
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.007zbMath1497.91107arXiv2007.01552OpenAlexW4220970639MaRDI QIDQ2673213
Achille Basile, Surekha Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Publication date: 9 June 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.01552
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
This page was built for publication: Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
