Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice (Q2673213)

This paper studies social choice between two alternatives. It develops representation formulae that extend the quota-majority method from the case of every voter asked to declare a strict preference to the case of weak preference. The idea explored is of successive extension, applying a further quota majority only to profiles for which the previous representation formula has not given a value. It is shown that this is the only way to produce anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice functions. It is also shown that the choice of the successive quotas to apply for representing an anonymous non-manipulable social choice function can be done in a unique way. A key element in the construction is the concept of veto pairs of voters sets. The results are derived by proving that general (i.e. not necessarily anonymous) non-manipulable social choice functions are in a one-to one correspondence with suitable collections of veto pairs. The notion of neutrality up to one voter is proposed and it is demonstrated that, in the context of indifference allowed, neutral up to one anonymous non-manipulable rules correspond to adjusted majority rules. The cardinalities of diverse subclasses of the class of non-manipulable social choice functions characterized in terms of anonymity, efficiency or neutrality up to one are established.