The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions (Q2050988)

This article starts from the concept of nonempty superset closed families of coalitions (this notion is known under the name of ``committee'', in the literature dedicated to social choice). This concept can be seen as a generalization of the notion of antichain, or Sperner family, to which is equivalent for finite V societies. The authors introduced a slight modification to treat the complexity of all possible situations such as to consider the possibility of empty families and that the case where the family contains the empty set. The step from binary to two-valued functions and the extension for finite society are relevant, according with authors opinion. After the presentation of the relevant literature, in section 2 are introduced the dominance relation between profiles and the concept of compatibility of social choice function with the dominance. In the end of this part is presented a comparison of compatibility with the notions of essentially ab-based and ab-monotonic due to Barbera. Some notions which are preparatory to the definition of index of a profile, and the index it self are presented in the third section of the paper. This is a tool for the definition of some special scfs (social choice function) of sequential form, presented in the fourth section. These functions are coalitional strategy-proof, whereas that there are no other two valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions (proved in section 5). The same part contains two specializations of the main theorem, a representation of strongly CSP (coalition strategy proof) social choice function.