Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0054-2MaRDI QIDQ2500716zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Quesada

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0054-2

zbMATH Keywords

number of votersproportion of dictatorial social welfare functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226094 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information and preference aggregation
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

Cited in

(9)

• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• Existence of approximate social welfare
• Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
• The number of times an anonymous rule violates independence in the \(3 \times 3\) case
• Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?
• Aggregating incomplete rankings
• Majority decisions when abstention is possible
• Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
• Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions

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