Majority decisions when abstention is possible

DOI10.1016/J.DISC.2011.12.024zbMATH Open1243.91037arXiv1003.2756OpenAlexW181123448MaRDI QIDQ764902FDOQ764902

Authors: Nicholas Matteo, S. Shelah, Paul Larson 

Publication date: 16 March 2012

Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in citet{shelah2009mdp}, but here we allow each voter to abstain. There are four cases.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.2756

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zbMATH Keywords

tournamentchoice functionCondorcet's paradoxmajority decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes
• The Voting Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• What majority decisions are possible
• Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations

Cited In (6)

• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• Majority voting on orders
• Majority vote following a debate
• On exiting after voting
• Arrovian aggregation models
• What majority decisions are possible

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