Majority decisions when abstention is possible

DOI10.1016/J.DISC.2011.12.024zbMATH Open1243.91037OpenAlexW181123448MaRDI QIDQ764902FDOQ764902

Authors Nicholas Matteo, S. Shelah, Paul Larson

Publication date 16 March 2012

Published in Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.2756

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentchoice functionCondorcet's paradoxmajority decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice functions agree, on every pair, with the majority of some finite subfamily of the voters? For the problem as stated, a complete characterization was given in citet{shelah2009mdp}, but here we allow each voter to abstain. There are four cases.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
• On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes
• The Voting Problem
• Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations
• What majority decisions are possible

Cited in

(7)

• Majority vote following a debate
• On exiting after voting
• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
• What majority decisions are possible
• Arrovian aggregation models
• Majority voting on orders

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