On exiting after voting

DOI10.1007/S00182-005-0005-2MaRDI QIDQ2491086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dolors Berga, G. Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejdanro Neme

Publication date 26 May 2006

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15136

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Stability and voting by committees with exit
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
• Stability and voting by committees with exit
• Voting by Committees
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
• Voting for voters: the unanimity case

Cited in

(8)

• Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
• An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Voting for voters: the unanimity case
• Stability and voting by committees with exit

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