On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
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Publication:1704055
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Cites work
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Non-bossiness
- On exiting after voting
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Voting by Committees
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
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