On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1704055
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0zbMath1392.91043OpenAlexW2600189468MaRDI QIDQ1704055
Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182480
Related Items
Cites Work
- Non-bossiness
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- On exiting after voting
- Voting by Committees
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
