| Publication | Date of Publication | Type |
|---|
False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
Theory and Decision | 2024-09-27 | Paper |
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
Theoretical Economics | 2023-10-17 | Paper |
Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 2023-06-22 | Paper |
Salvador Barberà
| 2022-01-05 | Paper |
Corrigendum to: ``On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
Games and Economic Behavior | 2021-11-24 | Paper |
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
Games and Economic Behavior | 2020-11-24 | Paper |
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Journal of Economic Theory | 2020-02-17 | Paper |
On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
Journal of Applied Mathematics | 2019-11-19 | Paper |
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Theoretical Economics | 2018-09-11 | Paper |
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
International Economic Review | 2018-04-10 | Paper |
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
Social Choice and Welfare | 2018-03-08 | Paper |
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
Theory and Decision | 2018-02-08 | Paper |
John F. Nash's contributions to economics: equilibrium and bargaining
| 2017-10-27 | Paper |
Matching markets under (in)complete information
Journal of Economic Theory | 2015-11-23 | Paper |
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
Theory and Decision | 2015-11-13 | Paper |
The division problem under constraints
Games and Economic Behavior | 2015-05-19 | Paper |
On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
Journal of Economic Theory | 2015-02-04 | Paper |
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
Journal of Economic Theory | 2014-11-19 | Paper |
Modern social choice theory: from impossibility to possibility
| 2013-05-22 | Paper |
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2013-02-20 | Paper |
The division problem with voluntary participation
Social Choice and Welfare | 2012-06-13 | Paper |
On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Games and Economic Behavior | 2012-03-19 | Paper |
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
Games and Economic Behavior | 2011-07-08 | Paper |
The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 2011-01-21 | Paper |
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
Games and Economic Behavior | 2009-01-26 | Paper |
Weighted approval voting
Economic Theory | 2008-05-26 | Paper |
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
International Journal of Game Theory | 2008-04-23 | Paper |
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
Review of Economic Design | 2007-12-06 | Paper |
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
Games and Economic Behavior | 2007-11-30 | Paper |
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
Journal of Economic Theory | 2007-10-26 | Paper |
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Mathematical Social Sciences | 2007-10-10 | Paper |
On exiting after voting
International Journal of Game Theory | 2006-05-26 | Paper |
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
Social Choice and Welfare | 2005-08-22 | Paper |
Voting by committees under constraints
Journal of Economic Theory | 2005-08-05 | Paper |
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
International Journal of Game Theory | 2005-02-24 | Paper |
Stability and voting by committees with exit
Social Choice and Welfare | 2005-02-11 | Paper |
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
Social Choice and Welfare | 2005-02-11 | Paper |
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
Mathematical Social Sciences | 2004-06-11 | Paper |
The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2003-07-14 | Paper |
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
Games and Economic Behavior | 2003-06-17 | Paper |
Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
Games and Economic Behavior | 2002-09-30 | Paper |
On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
Optimization | 2002-05-22 | Paper |
Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
Journal of Economic Theory | 2001-03-04 | Paper |
Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
Games and Economic Behavior | 1999-05-25 | Paper |
Voting under constraints
Journal of Economic Theory | 1998-01-05 | Paper |
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
Journal of Economic Theory | 1997-10-01 | Paper |
Notes on a new compromisw value: thex-value†
Optimization | 1997-08-18 | Paper |
Equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games
International Journal of Game Theory | 1997-02-04 | Paper |
A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox
Games and Economic Behavior | 1996-11-26 | Paper |
Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 1993-08-23 | Paper |
More on the `anti-folk theorem'
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 1989-01-01 | Paper |
