Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
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Publication:1272626
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0643zbMath0912.90010OpenAlexW2157039273MaRDI QIDQ1272626
Salvador Barberá, Jordi Massó, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publication date: 25 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/142827
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Cites Work
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