A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
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Publication:2452129
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9zbMath1288.91128OpenAlexW2144177802MaRDI QIDQ2452129
Stephen Ching, Shigehiro Serizawa, Shuhei Morimoto
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13806
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