A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
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Publication:2452129
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0648-9zbMATH Open1288.91128OpenAlexW2144177802MaRDI QIDQ2452129FDOQ2452129
Stephen Ching, Shigehiro Serizawa, Shuhei Morimoto
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13806
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Cited In (10)
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Non-bossiness
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
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