Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1852672)
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1440128
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
Cited in
(33)- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Non-bossiness
- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Consistent house allocation
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1852672)
