All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
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Publication:6076917
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Cites work
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Large extensive form games
- Menu mechanisms
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
- On cores and indivisibility
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- One-dimensional mechanism design
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cited in
(7)- Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Group obvious strategy-proofness: definition and characterization
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
- An algorithmic theory of simplicity in mechanism design
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