Group obvious strategy-proofness: definition and characterization

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103216MaRDI QIDQ6846769zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date 11 March 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103216

zbMATH Keywords

group strategy-proofnessobvious strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Large extensive form games
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Voting by Committees

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