Voting by Committees
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Size approval voting
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Signed orders and power set extensions
- Binary interactions and subset choice
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Aggregating ordinal probabilities on finite sets
- Voting under constraints
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- Between liberalism and democracy.
- Revealed votes
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- How to identify experts in a community?
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
- Upper set rules with binary ranges
- Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
- Random dictatorship domains
- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Salvador Barberà
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- Group identification: an integrated approach
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Matching with partners and projects
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
- Committees with leaks
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Simple collective identity functions
- A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Qualified voting systems
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Community standards
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Separable discrete preferences
- On exiting after voting
- Unanimity and resource monotonicity
- Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators
- Menu mechanisms
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898602 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- On the existence of majority committee
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Complexities of electing diverse committees
- Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
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