Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109493zbMath1451.91048OpenAlexW3080463712MaRDI QIDQ2209557

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno

Publication date: 4 November 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493

zbMATH Keywords

group strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionpreference reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives ⋮ On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness

Cites Work

• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Social aggregators
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Voting by Committees
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters

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