Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
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Publication:2209557
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109493zbMath1451.91048OpenAlexW3080463712MaRDI QIDQ2209557
Publication date: 4 November 2020
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493
Related Items (2)
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives ⋮ On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
Cites Work
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Social aggregators
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Voting by Committees
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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